Hi folks, thanks for visiting my webpage I hope you find the info you need.
Specifically, you are going to find kind of a short CV, my work in progress, and some info related to my PhD life.
In the last part I give you contact information to be in touch.
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Work in Progress
Effects of Concession Revenue Sharing Contracts and Airline Alliances in Airport Competition
In the last decades the number of airports has grown substantially leaving areas where two or more airports share a catchment area. On the other hand, the airlines market has been partially deregulated which has intensified competition. These situations have produced controversial vertical agreements as they raise possible anti-competitive issues.
This paper considers a type of vertical agreement, concession revenue sharing contract, to analyze how airport-airline vertical structures compete for passengers when they share a catchment area. The analysis distinguishes the effect of ownership structure of airports. Parallel alliances in the airlines market are also considered.
Our results point out that airports have incentives to share the whole concession revenues, and that parallel alliances may improve Social Welfare. These results have policy implications because this kind of contract encourages Social Welfare, so they should to be leniently looked, just as the formation of alliances.
Airport-Airlines Bargaining Power and Concession Revenue Sharing Contracts
Traditionally it has been considered airports as natural monopolies; however, since airlines deregulation movement began, airlines have countervailed their bargaining power.
Nowadays, airlines are decision maker in the vertical structure built between airports and airlines. This paper analyzes the airport-airline decision over to set a concession revenue sharing contract when competition in the downstream market exists.
The countervailing bargaining power is going to be decisive to determine whether airport-airline pair engages in this kind of contract; and if the airport decides an exclusive or non-exclusive sharing.
The results point out that airports with high concession revenues per passenger set an exclusive contract with just one airline; whereas, airports with low concession revenues per passenger prefer to share those revenues without exclusivity. These results lead to differences in the downstream market rivalry.
Spatial effects in the Spanish Aena airports network
Since the airport privatization movement in UK 1987, there is a debate about the privatization of airports and how to do it. Spain is the only big country that run most of airports as a complete network.
In the last years, due to financial constraints, the whole network has been partially privatized, which opens the debate whether it is more profitable to privatize the whole network, slots of airports, or just individually.
Opposed arguments can be found, however, AENA argues that maintaining the airports under the same ownership brings positive network effects.
Thus, in this paper I analyze the effects of the airports depending on their geographical situation using spatial econometric models. The preliminary results point out that the network effects are higher as long as more airports are considered in the econometric analysis. This results support the AENA decision.
- Feb. 2017 – 5th Student Workshop in Industrial and Public Economics (WIPE) organized by CREIP and Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Reus.
- June 2017 – ITEA Annual Conference and School on Transportation Economics, Barcelona.