The role of asymmetric innovation’s sizes in technology licensing under partial vertical integration
Mariola Sánchez, Adrián Nerja
Research in Economics
DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2024.100958
What is it about?
This paper explores the impact of asymmetric innovation sizes on technology licensing, particularly under conditions of partial vertical integration. It compares scenarios of exclusive licenses and cross-licenses in a successive duopoly model, where two technology owners and two firms compete in a differentiated product market.
The paper delves into the strategic decisions of patent holders, optimal contracts in technology licenses, and the incentives of partially vertically integrated firms to license their rivals.
It also discusses the implications of disruptive technology from a regulatory point of view and presents results and determinants of the strategic decision of the licensing programs for both patent holders.
The paper provides detailed analysis and findings related to the impact of innovation sizes on technology licensing under partial vertical integration.
Why is it important?
The paper is important for several reasons:
- Strategic Decision-Making: The research delves into the strategic decisions of patent holders or technology owners about how many competing firms to license in the context of partial vertical integration. This is crucial as it sheds light on the decision-making process of technology owners in a competitive market environment.
- Optimal Contracts in Technology Licenses: The document discusses the optimal contracts in technology licenses, which is essential for understanding the dynamics of technology licensing and the implications for both patent holders and licensee firms.
- Impact of Asymmetric Innovation Sizes: The research explores the impact of asymmetric innovation sizes on technology licensing under partial vertical integration. This is significant as it provides insights into how the size of innovation processes can influence technology licensing strategies and outcomes.
- Implications for Competition and Innovation: By comparing scenarios of exclusive licenses and cross-licenses in a successive duopoly model, the document contributes to understanding the implications for competition and innovation in the technology market.
- Regulatory Implications: The document discusses the implications of disruptive technology from a regulatory point of view, which is important for policymakers and regulatory authorities in understanding the dynamics of technology licensing and its impact on market competition.
- Economic and Entrepreneurial Significance: Technology licenses play a crucial role from an economical and entrepreneurial point of view, facilitating collective innovation for licensee firms and providing a low-risk way for licensor firms to leverage intellectual property assets. Understanding the dynamics of technology licensing is therefore important for fostering innovation and economic growth.
In summary, the paper is important because it provides insights into strategic decision-making, optimal contracts in technology licenses, the impact of asymmetric innovation sizes, regulatory implications, and the economic and entrepreneurial significance of technology licensing.
Perspectives
As the author of the paper, I believe that the study provides valuable insights into the strategic decision-making process of patent holders or technology owners when it comes to licensing their innovations.
The paper delves into the significance of technology transfers between affiliated firms and their impact on competition within the industry. By exploring the effects of partial vertical integration on technology licensing, the study aims to contribute to the existing literature on this topic.
The analysis encompasses a combination of factors that are not commonly studied together, making it an innovative contribution to the field.
Adrián Nerja
This page is a summary of: The role of asymmetric innovation’s sizes in technology licensing under partial vertical integration, Research in Economics, April 2024, Elsevier, DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2024.100958.
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